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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court properly dismissed the 
Peppers1 allegations against Zions as personal representative 
and as trustee where: (a) the Peppers alleged Zions' conduct 
constitutes fraud; (b) Zions' alleged misconduct came within 
the parameters of the October 8, 1981 Order; and (c) the 
Peppers purposely decided not to ask the District Court to 
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order either in whole or in part. 
2. Whether the District Court properly dismissed the 
Peppers' allegations against Zions as trustee where: (a) 
Peppers' allegations against Zions as trustee are grounded on 
Zions' alleged misconduct as personal representative; (b) the 
Probate Court entered the October 8, 1981 Order approving 
Zions' acts as personal representative and consequentially 
discharged Zions from further claim or liability for its duties 
as personal representative; (c) Zions, acting as trustee, 
specifically petitioned the Probate Court to enter the October 
8, 1981 Order; and (d) the Peppers received notice of Zions' 
petition as trustee but failed to object to the granting of 
that petition. 
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STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
This Appeal in part addresses the trial court's application 
of relevant provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, found in 
Title 75 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended. The following 
sections of the Code are thought to be determinative, and for 
reasons of length are reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief 
as Exhibits A-l through A-3: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-106 (1975), 75-3-1001 (1975) 
75-7-306 (1977). 
In addition, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is relevant to these proceedings and is reproduced in 
the Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit A-4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Peppers misstated important facts in their brief 
submitted in this appeal, which are necessary for a proper 
determination of both issues in this case. Accordingly, Zions 
hereby intends to supplement those facts stated in Appellants* 
Statement of Facts. 
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As to the first issue, the Peppers omitted the important 
fact that Phillip C. Pepper and Frances Morgan (the 
"Petitioners") filed a related motion in the original probate 
proceeding seeking to have the Probate Court's Order of October 
8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order"), a copy of which is 
attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit A-5, vacated under 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Estate of 
Jerome B. Pepper, Probate No. 62746 (3d D.C., Salt Lake County, 
August 31, 1982). (R. 1150). The failure to disclose this 
fact in their Statement of Facts led the Peppers to 
mischaracterize the first issue in this appeal. Brief of 
Appellant at 1. Accordingly, a full discussion of the Probate 
Court proceeding and its relationship to this appeal is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the facts and precedent 
pertinent to this appeal. 
Peppers' Complaint Against Zions 
This case began on April 6, 1982 when the Peppers filed 
their original Complaint against Zions. (R. 2). The First 
Cause of Action asserted in that Complaint alleged misfeasance 
on the part of Zions as personal representative of the estate 
of Jerome B. Pepper. The Peppers sought compensatory and 
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punitive damages in the amount of $5,000,000 for this first 
claim. (R. 12-17, 20-21). 
Zions* Motion to Dismiss 
Prior to filing its Answer, Zions moved the District Court 
to dismiss the First Cause of Action of the basis that the 
October 8, 1981 Order was res judicata on the question of any 
misfeasance on the part of Zions as personal representative of 
the estate. (R. 38-39). The District Court granted Zions1 
Motion with leave to the Peppers to amend their Complaint to 
allege that Zions had committed fraud. (R. 64-66). 
The Peppers Chose to Pursue Two Separate Courses of Action 
On July 1, 1982, prior to filing their First Amended 
Complaint, the Petitioners filed a Verified Petition in the 
original probate proceeding requesting that the Probate Court 
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(7). 
(R. 1150). The following day, the Peppers filed their First 
Amended Complaint, which contained the same factual allegations 
described in the original Complaint. (R. 69). In addition, 
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the Peppers alleged that Zions misrepresented facts to the 
Peppers, facts upon which the Peppers detrimentally relied. 
(R. 80). 
It is critical to note that the prayer for relief in the 
First Amended Complaint failed to include a request that the 
District Court vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in whole or in 
part. (R. 87-88). As shown by the discussion below, this 
omission was an intentional decision by the Peppers not to 
attempt to have the Order vacated. 
The Probate Court Rules on the Verified Petition 
On August 31, 1982, after due consideration, the Probate 
Court ruled that the October 8, 1981 Order should not be 
vacated; accordingly, the Court dismissed with prejudice the 
Verified Petition. The Petitioners then appealed the Probate 
Court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court. Estate of Jerome 
B. Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985). (R. 1150). 
Zions Argues the Mendenhall Decision in Defense of 
the Probate Court's Decision 
On appeal, Zions raised a number of arguments in support of 
the Probate Court's decision. One argument was based on the 
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1980 decision by this Court in Mendenhall v. Kingston/ 610 P„ 
2d 1287 (Utah 1980). (R. 1151). In Mendenhall, the Court held 
that under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an 
aggrieved party may attack an adverse order in either of two 
ways: (1) a party may move to vacate the Order granted in the 
original proceeding pursuant to Rule 60(b); or (2) a party may 
collaterally attack the Order in an independent action. The 
Mendenhall Court explicitly held that a party may not do both. 
Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d at 1289. 
Petitioner's Response 
In response, Petitioner's stated: 
There is no dispute that Zions has cited the 
proper authority and the proper law on the 
matter. However, no independent action has 
been filed by the Peppers to vacate the 
order which was entered by the Probate 
Court. While it is true that there is 
another action pending by Peppers against 
Zions, that action is not to obtain vacation 
of the October 8, 1981 Order. Reply Brief 
of Appellants, Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 
16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985). (R. 1151). 
Thus, the Peppers have intentionally chosen not to attack 
the October 8, 1981 Order in this proceeding so that they might 
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preserve the possibility of success on their Rule 60(b) Motion 
in the original probate proceeding. 
Supreme Court Decision on Rule 60(b) Appeal 
After full briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court 
rendered a decision on August 5, 1985 which affirmed the 
Probate Court's decision. Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 16 Utah 
App. Rptr. 8 (1985). As a result of the Petitioner's 
representation quoted above, the Mendenhall decision was not a 
basis for the Supreme Court's affirmance. Estate of Jerome B. 
Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985). 
The second issue in this appeal concerns the effect of the 
October 8, 1981 Order on the Peppers' allegations of 
misfeasance by Zions acting as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper 
Estate. The Peppers' Statement of Facts attempts to minimize 
Zions' participation as trustee in securing that Order. 
However, the record reflects that Zions petitioned the Probate 
Court in its capacity as both personal representative and 
trustee. The Petition requested that the Probate Court: 
1. Approve the final accounting submitted 
by Zions acting as personal 
representative; 
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2. Approve the sale of assets to Hugo Neu 
consummated by Zions while acting as 
trustee; 
3. Approve the proposed transfer of assets 
and liabilities from the personal 
representative to the trustee; 
4. Authorize the trustee to accept the 
transfer of assets and liabilities, to 
pay certain liabilities of the estate, 
and to administer the assets and 
liabilities so transferred in 
accordance with the Trust Agreement; and 
5. Discharge the personal representative 
from further claim or liability from 
any interested party and close the 
estate, (R. 1316-17). 
The importance of Zions' role as trustee in obtaining the 
October 8, 1981 Order is discussed in full in Point II below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court properly dismissed Appellants' 
allegations against Zions, acting as both personal 
representative and trustee for the Jerome B. Pepper Estatec 
The October 8, 1981 Final Settlement Order is conclusive as to 
all claims against Zions as personal representative, whether 
grounded in negligence, fraud, or otherwise, unless the Peppers 
seek to have the October 8, 1981 Order vacated in whole or in 
- 8 -
part. In order to protect their related action to vacate the 
October 8, 1981 Order in the original probate proceeding 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, Probate No. 62746 (3d D.C., Salt 
Lake County); aff'd, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985), the Peppers 
have elected not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in 
this proceeding. Thus, the October 8, 1981 Order will not be 
set aside and the Peppers are precluded from any recovery 
against Zions, acting as personal representative, as a result 
of Zions1 discharge under the October 8, 1981 Order. 
Under Utah law, Zions, acting as trustee, should not be 
held liable for breaching its duties for failure to correct the 
personal representative's alleged mistakes, where the personal 
representative's actions have been approved in a final order 
pursuant to the petition of the trustee. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-306(6) (1978). Moreover, policy considerations support 
the conclusion that even if Zions had not petitioned as trustee 
for the October 8, 1981 Order, the Court should hold the 
October 8, 1981 Order conclusive as to the trustee's liability 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978), in that the October 
8, 1981 Order determined that Zions, acting as the personal 
representative, did not breach its duty to the Peppers. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE FINAL ORDER IS RES JUDICATA AS TO ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
ZIONS FOR ALL OF ITS ACTIONS OR OMISSIONS AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, INCLUDING FRAUD, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS 
THE OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER IS VACATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. 
The issue before the Court is whether the Peppers can sue 
Zions for its alleged fraudulent misconduct in its 
administration of the Jerome B. Pepper Estate in light of the 
Peppers' purposeful decision not to ask the District Court to 
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order. The Peppers have 
misconstrued the District Court's decision and its 
application. The District Court's decision does not "permit a 
personal representative to defraud the estate with impunity." 
Brief of Appellants at 7-8. Rather, the District Court's Order 
correctly recognizes that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide an aggrieved party with two choices in seeking redress 
from a Final Order. A party may either seek to vacate the 
Final Order in the original probate proceeding pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), or attack the Final Order 
collaterally through an independent action pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). A party may not do both. 
Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980). 
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Because the Peppers purposely chose not to seek the 
vacation of the October 8, 1981 Order in this action, the 
Mendenhall decision supports the District Court's conclusion 
that the October 8, 1981 Order was res judicata as to all of 
Peppers' claims against Zions, in its capacity as personal 
representative of the Pepper Estate. Bernard v. Atlebury, 629 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1981); International Resources v. Dunfield, 
599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979). This holding of the District 
Court is much narrower in scope than that set forth in the 
Peppers' brief. 
A. Utah Law Permits a Personal Representative's 
Accounting to be Challenged on the Basis of Fraud, 
Provided the Allegations Attack the Final Order Itself 
and Correspondingly Seek to Have it Vacated. 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, a 
number of Utah cases considered the issue of how pervasive an 
Order settling an executor's account ought to be. For example, 
the court in In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705 
(1916), stated: 
It is apparent, therefore, that an 
executor's or administrator's account which 
has been allowed can be assailed only in 
equity and upon the same grounds as other 
judgments. Moreover, such attacks cannot be 
made, as they were attempted to be made in 
- 11 -
this proceeding, by a mere reference to some 
items in the objections filed to the 
allowance of the final account, but the 
attack must be made as in other cases where 
a judgment is assailed for fraud, etc. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah at 132, 158 P. at 709. Accord, 
Miller v. Walker Bank Sc Trust Co., 17 Utah 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675, 
(1965); In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 P.2d 111, (1947). 
In Auerbach v. Samuel, 10 Utah 2d 152, 154 349 P.2d, 112, 
114 (1960), the Court observed that: 
The difficulty confronting plaintiffs is the 
binding effect with which such orders and 
decrees are endowed. At this late date they 
could pierce the protective armor of the 
decrees referred to above and successfully 
assert an interest in the estate only by 
showing that they have been victims of 
fraud; and this would have to be a kind 
known as extrinsic fraud. 
Extrinsic fraud is to be distinguished 
from the ordinary garden variety of fraud. 
The latter . . . is that which occurs within 
the framework of the actual conduct at the 
trial, . . . . The responsibility rests 
upon those conducting the trial to expose 
and deal with any such deception . . . . 
On the other hand, extrinsic fraud, 
with which we are here concerned, is of a 
different character. It is sometimes 
referred to as collateral fraud because it 
is the type of fraud which would justify 
setting aside a decree or judgment on 
collateral attack. (Emphasis added.) 
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In summary, under pre-Utah Uniform Probate Code law 
discussed above, one can conclude that if a party wished to 
question a fiduciary's actions after court approval a Final 
Order, that party was required to attack the Order of 
approval. Without such an attack, the doctrine of res judicata 
would act as an absolute bar to any proceeding against the 
fiduciary. 
B. The Utah Uniform Probate Code Adopts the Pre-Uniform 
Probate Code Principles. 
The principle that a party must attack a Final Order in 
order to challenge a fiduciary's actions was incorporated into 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1001 sets 
forth the general rule that a Final Order will Mdischarg[e] the 
personal representative from further claim or demand of any 
interested person." Notwithstanding this rule, the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code does provide for relief from a Final Order 
if such Order was procured by fraud. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-106. The Editorial Board Comments to section 75-1-106 
provide that the party asserting fraud must necessarily attack 
the Final Order and have it annulled or vacated in order to 
challenge the personal representative in regards to his 
fraudulent acts. These Comments, in pertinent part, provide: 
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Any action under this Section is subject to 
usual rules of res judicata; thus, if a 
forged will has been informally probated, an 
heir discovers the forgery, and then there 
is a formal proceeding under Section 
75-3-1001 of which the heir is given notice, 
followed by an order of complete settlement 
of the estate, the heir could not bring a 
subsequent action under this section but 
would be bound by the litigation in which 
the issue could have been raised. 
The usual rules for securing relief for 
fraud on a court would govern, however. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Editorial Board Comments, Uniform Probate Code § 1-106. The 
usual relief given an aggrieved party in this situation is to 
vacate the Order obtained by fraudc In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 
Utah at 132, 158 P. at 709 
C. The Peppers' Choice Not to Attack the October 8, 1981 
Order Precludes Their Relief From Such Order. 
The Peppers may not proceed against Zions in its capacity 
as personal representative of the Jerome B. Pepper Estate on 
any legal theory unless they also attack the October 8, 1981 
Order. That Order must be set aside in whole or in part before 
the Peppers are open to any recovery. Because the Peppers have 
elected not to attack the October 8, 1981 Order in this 
proceeding, they cannot recover on any claims against Zions 
which fall within the ambit of the October 8, 1981 Order. 
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Accordingly, Peppers1 claims which fell within the ambit of the 
October 8, 1981 Order v*ere properly dismissed with prejudice. 
POINT II. 
ZIONS, IN ITS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME B. 
PEPPER INTER V[VOS TRUST, IS PROTECTED FROM ANY 
FURTHER CLAIM OF THE PEPPERS BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
Under Utah law, a trustee is granted statutory protection 
from any breach of fiduciary duty by a predecessor fiduciary: 
In the absence of actual knowledge or 
information which would cause a reasonable 
trustee to inquire further, no trustee shall 
be liable for failure to take necessary 
steps to compel the redress of any breach of 
trust or fiduciary duty by any predecessor 
personal representative, trustee, or other 
fiduciary. Ths provisions of this section 
[§ 75-7-3Q6(l)-(6)] shall not be construed 
to limit the fiduciary liability of any 
trustee for his own acts or omissions with 
respect to the trust estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-336(6). When this subsection is viewed 
as it relates to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(5), neither of which 
are part of the Uniform Probate Code, it is clear that the Utah 
Legislature intended for trustees to be responsible for their 
own actions, and not for those of predecessor fiduciaries. It 
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then follows that in order to overcome the statutory protection 
afforded trustees, a complaining party must aLlege and prove: 
1. The predecessor fiduciary breached the 
predecessor's duty to the complaining party; 
and 
2. The current trustee had actual 
knowledge or information of the breach. 
In the present case, Zions, acting as trustee, petitioned 
the Probate Court for an Order discharging Zions as personal 
representative for the Jerome B. Pepper Estate. (R. 1313-18). 
Pursuant to that petition, the Probate Court entered its Order 
determining that the personal representative had not breached 
any duties to the Peppers. (R. 1322-28). This ruling is 
conclusive under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6), for purposes of 
determining whether there was any breach of duty by Zions 
committed while it was acting as personal representative. In 
light of the fact that the very issue the Peppers have raised 
against Zions as trustee has been decided in a Final Order 
pursuant to a petition filed by Zions, acting as trustee, the 
Peppers cannot prove that the predecessor fiduciary breached 
its duty unless that Final Order is vacated in whole or in 
part. It must once again be emphasized that the Peppers have 
elected not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in this 
- 16 -
proceeding. It then follows that the October 8, 1981 Order is 
res judicata as to the Peppers' claims against Zions, acting in 
its capacity as trustee. 
A. Even Under Peppers' Analysis, the Doctrine of Res 
Judicata Applies to This Appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) provides the rule that 
. . . [C]laim preclusion bars the 
relitigation by the parties or their privies 
of a claim for relief that was once 
litigated on the merits and resulted in a 
final judgment between the same parties or 
their privies . . . . The same rule also 
prevents relitigation of claims that could 
and should have been litigated in the prior 
action but were not. (Citations omitted.) 
Because the October 8, 1981 Order approved both the personal 
representative's final accounting and the acceptance of assets 
and liabilities by the trustee, and because the trustee 
specifically petitioned the Probate Court for this Order, Zions 
believes that the October 8, 1981 Order specifically 
adjudicated the Peppers' claims against Zions, acting as 
Trustee. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978). Even if 
this Court determined that the Order did not specifically 
adjudicate such claims against Zions, acting as trustee, any 
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claims the Peppers assert against Zions "could and should" have 
been set forth at the time Zions' petition was heard on October 
7, 1981, (R, 1319). It is improper to raise these issues for 
the first time in these proceedings. 
In recognition of the fact that claim preclusion bars 
claims that "could and should" have been presented, the Peppers 
argue that their claims against Zions in its capacity as 
trustee did not mature until the October 8, 1981 Order was 
entered. Appellant's Brief at 15, The Peppers are mistaken. 
If one assumes, for purposes of this appeal, that Zions 
acting as trustee, is charged with the same knowledge as Zions, 
in its capacity as personal representative, it then follows 
that the Peppers* claims against Zions, acting as trustee, 
would accrue as each alleged breach by Zions, acting as 
personal representative, occurred, as where Zions, acting as 
trustee, allegedly failed to take any steps to seek redress for 
the alleged improper acts of the personal representative. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978). Moreover, when Zions, in its 
capacity as trustee, filed its petition on September 23, 1981 
seeking court approval of Zions1 final account as personal 
representative, the trustee indicated full approval of the 
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final accounting prepared by the personal representative. When 
notice of this petition was sent to the Peppers (R. 1319-20), 
Zions, acting as trustee, placed the Peppers on notice that the 
trustee approved of Zions' acts as personal representative and 
that the trustee was seeking judicial protection from further 
liability in its act of filing such accounting and petition for 
approval. The hearing on Zions' petition was the appropriate 
forum for the Peppers to appear and object to Zions' actions; 
nevertheless, the Peppers chose not to take such action. See 
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8, 10 (1985). 
The logical reaction to such inaction compels the conclusion 
that the Peppers' claims "could and should" have been asserted 
when the October 7, 1981 hearing was held, and that the 
Peppers' failure to assert those claims at that time bars 
litigation of them in this proceeding. 
Thus, based on the Peppers' own analysis of the 
applicability of the doctrine of res judicata (claim 
preclusion), the Peppers' claims against Zions in its capacity 
as trustee are precluded pursuant to the October 8, 1981 Order. 
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B. Even if Zions, acting as Trustee, Had Not Been a 
Petitioner, Policy Considerations Support the Position 
That the October 8, 1981 Order Precludes Any Action by 
Plaintiffs Against Zions, in Its Capacity as Trustee, 
The Peppers cite cases from four non Uniform Probate Code 
jurisdictions in support of their arguments which hold that the 
discharge of a personal representative will not bar subsequent 
claims against a trustee who is a beneficiary of the estate for 
the acts or omissions of that personal representative. These 
cases are distinguishable from the present case in that they 
consider situations in which the trustee did not join in the 
petition seeking approval of the personal representative's 
final accounting with corresponding discharge of the personal 
representative from further liability. Had these courts been 
faced with the facts of this appeal, where the trustee 
petitioned for approval of the Final Order, it is likely that 
each case would have held the trustee entitled to the 
protection of the Order for which it had sought approval. 
Even if Zions, acting as trustee, had not been a party to 
the petition for approval of the personal representative's 
final accounting, it does not necessarily follow that this 
Court should adopt the rule established in the four 
jurisdictions cited by the Peppers. Six jurisdictions, 
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including California, have held conversely to the premise 
presented by Appellants. These jurisdictions hold that the 
approval of a personal representative's final accounting 
protects the trustee from any further claims of interested 
persons. Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1290 (1938). The most recent of 
these cases, which supports the position contrary to that 
presented by Appellants, is Pike v. Markham, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 
1981) (cited in 6 A.L.R. Blue Book of Supplemental Decisions 
464 (1984). Because of this split in authority, it is 
appropriate for this Court to look beyond the decisions cited 
in Appellant's brief and consider instead those policies which 
should control this issue and which should consequentially be 
adopted in this state. 
Zions proposes that the most important policy issues to be 
addressed in determining whether to adopt the rule espoused by 
the Peppers, that approval of a personal representative's final 
accounting should not also protect the trustee, is whether such 
a rule would both (1) protect trust beneficiaries and (2) not 
make unfair distinctions between different classes of trustees. 
The rule proposed by the Peppers is likely to harm 
beneficiaries and unfairly distinguish between different 
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classes of trustees. Given such a rule, logically follows that 
the duty to be imposed on trustees can be circumvented in 
either of two ways: (2) the trustee can, as here, join in the 
petition seeking the approval of the personal representative's 
accounting; and (2) the trustee can insist on exculpatory 
language for its own protection in the trust agreement itself. 
For example, the trust could provide: 
Each trustee shall be exempt from any 
liability in any way related to the prior 
actions or omissions of any prior 
fiduciaries and each is specifically hereby 
relieved of any duty to examine or review 
the actions of prior fiduciaries. 
If the rule urged by the plaintiffs were adopted in Utah, 
the liability of trustees in such situations would become a 
trap for the unwary. Corporate fiduciaries, familiar with the 
ruling and its implications, would use either or both of the 
means suggested above to avoid liability. Individual trustees, 
however, not being as versed in the technical aspects of the 
law, might not be aware of the rule and its implications, and 
could be caught. To avoid this undesireable consequence, 
policy should compel the conclusion that the Peppers and other 
similarly-situated trust beneficiaries be limited to their 
remedy in original probate proceedings, that proceeding most 
logical for prosecuting their objections. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly ruled in the July 5, 1985 
Order of Partial Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A-6 in the Addendum, that in view of The 
Peppers' decision not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981 
Order, that Order is res judicata as to all of the Peppers1 
claims against Zions in its capacity as personal 
representative. The District Court also correctly ruled that 
since Zions, acting as trustee, petitioned the Court for entry 
of the October 8, 1981 Order, Zions was entitled to rely upon 
that Order for protection from the Peppers1 claims against the 
trustee, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306 (6) (1978). 
In light of these arguments and corresponding authority, 
Zions respectfully requests that the Supreme Court affirm the 
District Court's decision on both issues presented in this 
appeal. In addition, Zions requests that it be awarded its 
costs incurred in pursuing this action. 
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DATED: January SL. 1986 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
GARY R. HOWE 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
SHERYL L. SIMPSON 
By 
Sheryl (LI. Simpsoi 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Respondent Zions First 
National Bank 
CDN1810S 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A-l 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-106. Effect of Fraud and evasion. 
Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any 
proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or if 
fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes 
of this code, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate 
relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from 
any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from 
the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be 
commenced within three years after the discovery of the fraud, 
but no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator 
of the fraud later than five years after the time of commission 
of the fraud. This section has no bearing on remedies relating 
to fraud practiced on a decedent during his lifetime which 
affects the succession of his estate. 
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Exhibit A-2 
Utah Code Ann,§ 75-3-1001. Formal proceedings terminating 
administration - Testate or intestate - Order of general 
protection. 
(1) A personal representative or any interested person may 
petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate. 
The personal representative may petition at any time, and any 
other interested person may petition after one year from the 
appointment of the original personal representative except that 
no petition under this section may be entertained until the 
time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of 
the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court 
to determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider 
the final account or compel or approve an accounting and 
distribution, to construe any will or determine heirs, and to 
adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the 
estate. After notice to all interested persons and hearing 
the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate 
conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of 
the estate, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement 
and directing or approving distribution of the estate and 
discharging the personal representative from further claim or 
demand of any interested person. 
(2) If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as 
parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal 
testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order 
of complete settlement of the estate under this section, and 
after notice to the omitted or unnotified persons and other 
interested parties determined to be interested on the 
assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is 
conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding, 
may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and 
confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects 
all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new 
proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or 
unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy 
proceeding shall constitute prima facie proof of due execution 
of any will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that 
the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings 
determined this fact. 
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Exhibit A-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306. Personal liability of trustee to 
third parties. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee 
is not personally liable on contracts properly entered into in 
his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the 
trust estate unless he fails to reveal his representative 
capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract. 
(2) A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising 
from ownership or control of property of the trust estate or 
for torts committed in the course of administration of the 
trust estate only if he is personally at fault. 
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a trustee in 
his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership 
or control of the trust estate, or on torts committed in the 
course of trust administration may be asserted against the 
trust estate by proceeding against the trustee in his fiduciary 
capacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable 
therefor. 
(4) The question of liability as between the trust estate 
and the trustee individually may be determined in a proceeding 
for accounting, surcharge or indemnification or other 
appropriate proceeding. 
(5) Whenever an instrument creating a trust reserves to 
the settlor, or vests in an advisory or investment committee, 
or in any other person or persons, including one or more 
co-trustees to the exclusion of the trustee or to the exclusion 
of one or more of several trustees, authority to direct the 
making or retention of any investment, the excluded trustee or 
trustees shall not be liable, either individually or as a 
fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the making or retention 
of any investment pursuant to such direction. 
(6) In the absence of actual knowledge or information 
which would cause a reasonable trustee to inquire further, no 
trustee shall be liable for failure to take necessary steps to 
compel the redress of any breach of trust or fiduciary duty by 
any predecessor personal representative, trustee, or other 
fiduciary. The provisions of this section shall not be 
construed to limit the fiduciary liability of any trustee for 
his own acts or omissions with respect to the trust estate. 
- 27 -
Exhibit A-4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or 
Order. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has 
not been personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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MARRVEL E. HALL of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys foi Er.atc of Jerome 3. Fepper, Deceased 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1500 
lis7 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ \
 0 In the matter of the Estate of 
_ r < V JEROME B. PEPPER, 
1*t.^ \ Deceased, 
IB 
ORDER APPROVING FIRST AND 
FINAL ACCOUNT, APPROVING 
FINAL SETTLEMENT AND 
DISTRIBUTION; AND RATIFY-
ING AND APPROVING 
ACTS INCLUDING SALE OF 
INTEREST IN BUSINESS, 
Probate No. 62746 
The petition of Zions First National Bank for approval of 
First and Final Account for final settlement and distribution; for 
ratification and approval of acts including sale of interest in 
business, coming on regularly to be heard, it appearing to the 
Court that due and legal notice has been given to all interested 
parties as required by law, and no person appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court finds: 
1. The above named decedent died on January 13, 1976, a 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and thereafter 
petitioner was duly appointed and is now the qualified and acting 
Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent. 
2. Petitioner, as the personal representative of the 
decedent, has collected and managed the assets of the estate; has 
filed an inventory herein; has published notice to creditors; has 
paid all lawful claims of the decedent's creditors against the 
estate except for two claims as explained in paragraph 3 below; 
has elected to pay a portion the federal estate tax determined to 
be owed by the estate in the amount of $283,891.40 in installments 
(of which $91,658.00 remains unpaid); has obtained consent of the 
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State Tax Commission to pay a portion of the Utah Inheritance Tax 
of $157,830.00 in installments over a five-year period (of which 
$46,698.00 remains unpaid); and has performed all acts required of 
a Personal Representative by the laws of this state pertaining to 
estates of decedents. 
3. The time for presenting claims which arose prior to 
the death of the decedent has expired, all claims except for a 
pledge to Congregation Kol Ami, (which petitioner has arranged to 
pay in installments) and a claim of Peppers Allied Metals Company 
which will be settled in the course of liquidation of the latter 
corporation, have been paid; and there are no contingent, unliqui-
dated or future claims against the estate. There is no necessity 
to further delay distribution of the estate until the remaining 
claims, Utah inheritance tax and Federal Estate Tax have been paid 
in full. The assets remaining in the estate are not sufficient to 
pay said remaining obligations in any event. The petitioner, in 
its capacity as Trustee under a trust agreement entered into with 
the decedent, Jerome B. Pepper, on April 15, 1975 (during his 
lifetime), is the sole devisee and beneficiary of all of the 
rest, residue and remainder of the estate properties. The 
remaining death tax and pledge installment obligations should be 
paid by Petitioner out of trusts created under said agreement. 
Petitioner, as such Trustee, therefore, hereby assumes said 
obligations of the estate. The $427,036.34 open account balance 
owed to Peppers Allied Metals Company (a corporation controlled by 
the estate, which is presently in liquidation) is partially offset 
by a payable from said corporation to the trust as set forth in 
paragraph 8 below. 
4c Petitioner has filed its first and final accounting 
of its administration of this estate. Said accounting, consisting 
of a summary and schedules 1 through 11C, is attached to the 
petition as Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof. 
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5. As shown on schedules 7A and 8 of said accounting, on 
the 18th day of May, 1981, petitioner, in its capacity as Personal 
Representative, distributed to itself, in its capacity as Trustee 
under said agreement dated April 15, 1975 the decedent's interest 
as a co-venturer in the Learner-Pepper Company. 
6. On the 28th day of May, 1981, Petitioner, in its 
capacity as such Trustee, entered into an agreement, as Seller, 
with Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., a Massachusetts Corporation, 
as Buyer, for sale to the Buyer of decedentfs interest in the 
Learner-Pepper Company for $1,000,000. The sale price is subject 
to adjustment to reflect additional facts, if any, disclosed by an 
audit of the books of Learner-Pepper Company pursuant to the Joint 
Venture Purchase Agreement executed by the parties to said sale, a 
copy of which is attached to the petition as Exhibit B and by 
reference made a part thereof. All adult beneficiaries of said 
trust consented in writing to said sale. Copies of their consents 
are attached to the petition as Exhibits C-l through C-5 inclusive 
and are by reference made a part thereof. 
7. On the 22nd day of April, 1981, Petitioner, in its 
capacity as Personal Representative, on behalf of the Estate as 
controlling shareholder of Peppers Allied Metals Company, a Utah 
Corporation, together with the other shareholders, caused said 
company to adopt a plan of liquidation, a copy of which is 
attached to the petition as Exhibit D and by reference made a part 
thereof. In accordance with said plan of liquidation and under 
Petitioner's direction, the officers of Pepper Allied Metals 
Company, on May 23, 1981, caused that company, as Seller, to sell 
to Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., as Buyer, all of the fixed 
assets of its Ogcen, Utah, scrap metals recycling operation for 
$88,352.00, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached to the petition as Exhibit E and by reference 
made a part thereof, 
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3. In connection with the sale transactions described in 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 above, Petitioner, in its capacity as Trustee, 
«=** a Portion of the- proceeds of the sale of the Learner-Pepper 
Company Joint Venture interest to purchase, from the Utah Copper 
^vision, Kennecott Metals Company, a debt of Peppers Allied 
Metals company
 in the amounfc Q f $ 2 2 5 / 0 1 9 > 3 5 / and frQm T e l e d y n e 
National, a debt of Peppers Allied Metals Company in the amount of 
524,356.22. Purchase of these obligations was required by Hugo 
Neu steel Products, inc., the Buyer, as a condition to closing the 
^les transactions. Copies of two checks drawn by Petitioner on 
said Trust account to the respective Assignors of said debts are 
attached to the petition as Exhibit »F" which is by reference made 
a
 Part thereof. 
9. Petitioner's accounting should be approved, and 
a H of petitioner's acts in the administration of the estate, 
including those described in paragraphs 5 and 7 above, should be 
ratified and approved. 
10. Those acts of petitioner performed, in its capacity 
as Trustee in its administration of said Trust, which are 
Ascribed in paragraphs 6 and 8 above should be ratified and 
aPProved. 
THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 
a
*
 Ti1f final account of petitioner which is 
attached to the petition, together with all 
acts of petitioner in the administration of the 
estate be and are hereby approved and ratified; 
petitioner be and is hereby authorized and 
directed to distribute and transfer title to 
the assets of the estate to petitioner as 
Trustee under said Trust Agreement dated April 
15, 1975, to be held, administered and 
distributed in accordance with the provisions 
of said Trust Agreement, and, after petitioner 
nas made such final settlement and distribution 
and^has filed petitioner's receipts herein, 
petitioner shall be discharged and the 
administration of this estate closed. 
b- The acts of petitioner performed in 
administering said trust which are described 
herein be and are hereby ratified and approved. 
- 32 -
-4-
DATED this 
Petitioner as Trustee be and is hereby 
authorized and directed to pay the remaining 
pledge obligation, the Federal Estate Tax and 
Utan Inneritance Tax obligations and any 
remaining balance of the Peppers Allied Metals 
Comp"a7iy open account not otherwise disposed of 
in the course of liquidation of that corpora-
tion out: of the Trusts created under said Trust 
Agreement dated April 15, 1975. 
y day of / f ^ ^ / c , 1981. 
BY THE COURT 
s*Q)U 
A T T E S T D i s t r i c t Judge 
W. STERLING EVANS 
Cferk 
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CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
GARY R. HOWE (A15 52) 
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283) 
JEFFREY L. SHIELDS (A2947) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 531-7676 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions First National Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
PHILIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident, et al., 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 
N.A. et al. , 
Defendant 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 
N.A. , 
Third Party Defendant. 
vs. 
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada 
resident, et al.. 
Third Party Defendant, 
* * * * * * * 
ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(Honorable James S. Sawaya) 
Civil No. C-82-2779 
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: i 
i 
! 1 
II 
•I The motion of Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for 
i 
|j Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or in the alternative, for 
l| 
llPartial Summary Judgment came before the Court, the Honorable 
'I . . 
iJames S. Sawaya presiding, on the 6th day of May, 1985 at 2:00 
11 
• i 
i| p.m. Charles M. Bennett, Gary K. Howe and Jeffrey L. Shields, 
I 
iof and for Callister & Nebeker, appeared on behalf of 
ii 
' defendant, Zions First National Bank. Edward S. Sweeney and J. 
Peter Mulhern, of and for Biele, Haslam & Hatch, appeared on 
|behalf of the plaintiffs, Phillip C. Pepper, guardian and 
'conservator of Fannie N. Pepper, Phillip C. Pepper and Frances 
,JT. Morgan. H. Michael Keller, of and for VanCott, Bagley, 
;'Cornwall & McCarthy, appeared on behalf of third party 
!|defendants, Charles H. Foote and Fox & Co. Bernard L. Rose 
ii 
j!appeared on behalf of third party defendant, Fred M. Rosenthal. 
11 
11 
•[ The Court heard the argument of Mr. Bennett in favor of the 
ij 
}|motion and the argument of Mr. Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney in 
{'opposition to the motion. No other parties argued the motion. 
! The Court also considered the memoranda of counsel on the 
| motion. Thus, having been fully advised in the premises, the 
I Court entered its minute entry of May 6th, 1985 granting Zions1 
[motion. 
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Thereafter, Zions submitted a proposed order pursuant to 
Rule 2o9 and plaintiffs filed their objection to the scope of 
the proposed order. Memoranda was submitted by plaintiffs and 
Zions in support of their respective positions. A hearing was 
held on June 10, 1985 at 2:00 p.m. and the Court heard the 
argument of counsel. Thus, having been fully advised in the 
matter, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
1. The plaintiffs have expressly chosen not to seek to 
set aside or vacate the order of the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
in Probate No. 62746, the Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, dated 
October 8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order"). 
2. Accordingly, the October 8, 1981 Order remains res 
judicata as to all of plaintiffs1 claims against Zions First 
National Bank which fall within the purview of the October 8, 
1981 Order. 
3. All of the plaintiffs' claims in their first cause of 
action (paragraphs 50 through 69 of the plaintiffs1. Second 
Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982) fall within the 
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed. 
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4. All of the plaintiffs1 claims in their second cause of 
action (paragraphs 70 through 86) fall within the purview of 
the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed. 
5. Paragraphs 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs1 fifth 
cause of action fall within the purview of the October 8, 1981 
Order and should be dismissed. 
6. Since there is not just reason for further delay and 
since this Order constitutes a final order as to plaintiffs' 
first and second causes of action (and related parts of 
plaintiffs' fifth cause of action) it is proper for this Order 
to issue pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered: 
1. All of plaintiffs' claims which fall within the 
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. Those claims are encompassed in paragraphs 50 
through 69, 70 through 86, 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982. 
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2. This Order shall constitute a final order pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). 
DATED:/' 985 
CN2289B 
By The Court: / ' 
Tjne' Honorable James S.Sawaya 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
-ry^^-f 
y
 D<£gty Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified by the undersigned that four (4) 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK were served by mail, postage fully prepaid, 
upon counsel as follows: 
BIELE, HASLEM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
50 West Broadway 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this 15th day of January, 1986. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
